• November 5, 2024

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Will U.S.-Iran Trade Stand to Benefit Post-Nuclear Deal?

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One question I have received is whether we can expect to see increased trade between the U.S. and Iran following the lifting of certain nuclear-related sanctions last month. While I am keen to point out that the U.S. trade embargo with Iran has survived the nuclear accord largely intact and without significant modification, I am nonetheless convinced that there will be certain limited areas where trade is (and has long been) permissible and where that trade will be more easily facilitated as a result of the lifting of certain secondary sanctions targeting Iran.

It is useful to review U.S.-Iran trade statistics to see just how lowly U.S.-Iran trade ties have become since the dissolution of U.S.-Iran political relations and the onset of the U.S. trade embargo thereafter. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. exports to Iran totaled approximately $282.2 million in 2015 – mostly in line with years past. Meanwhile, U.S. imports of Iranian-origin goods totaled $10.8 million in 2015 – all of which occurred at the end of the year in December.

In comparison, in 2014, German exports to Iran totaled about 2.4 billion Euros (or close to $2.7 billion), while German imports of Iranian-origin goods approximated 295 million Euros (or $330 million). Similarly, in 2013, Chinese exports to Iran totaled about $13.7 billion and Chinese imports of Iranian-origin goods (including oil sales) approximated $22.9 billion – significantly greater than U.S. trade with Iran.

The U.S. Census Bureau does not provide statistics for what constitutes the majority of U.S. exports to Iran, although we can make informed predictions based on what trade is legally permissible. Mostly, I would expect the export of medicines, medical supplies, and agricultural commodities to comprise the brunt of the U.S. exports to Iran, as other areas of permissible trade – e.g., the sale of personal communications technologies under General License D-1 – have seen few movers in the United States.

Moreover, I would expect sales of medicine, medical supplies, and agricultural commodities to build over time as European and other foreign banks started to reconnect with their Iranian counterparts, thereby facilitating the transfer of funds in support of the underlying transactions. Under current law, as some readers will know, U.S. persons are prohibited from crediting or debiting an Iranian account and thus must utilize third-country intermediary financial institutions in order to effectuate the transfer of funds in support of permissible transactions with Iran, including humanitarian transactions. A major problem over the past several years is that, as European and other foreign banks cut off their correspondent relations with Iranian financial institutions, there became no manageable way for U.S. exporters to receive payment from Iran for the supply of medicines, medical supplies, and agricultural commodities. That issue should be significantly relaxed in the months ahead as those correspondent banking relationships are resumed and the process of transferring funds to and from Iran is simplified.

It is possible, too, that U.S. tech firms start to take advantage of the license authorization at General License D-1 – especially if the reputational risks associated with entering Iran are eased as a result of the influx of business in Iran. It was reported that Apple and certain other tech giants had expressed interest in entering Iran’s market and had begun conversations with both OFAC and Iranian distributors, although that seems to have been stymied by certain restrictions on the Iranian side.

Ironically, I don’t expect the new license authorization for the import of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs at 31 C.F.R. § 560.534 or the Statement of Licensing Policy for the sale or supply of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran to significantly increase the size of U.S.-Iran trade. While direct trade between the U.S. and Iran in regards to Iranian-origin carpets and certain foodstuffs – such as saffron and pistachios – will certainly increase, there has been a lot of illicit trade through third countries of these goods over the past decade, as others have reported, and thus any increased trade amounts present a false picture. Moreover, Boeing has signaled that it is not yet negotiating deals for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft with Iran and is remaining in a wait-and-see mode on whether to enter Iran’s market and at what pace. Based on Boeing’s official statements, I wouldn’t expect quick sales anytime soon.

That means the real test will be whether the lifting of U.S. secondary sanctions will have incidental benefits for U.S.-Iran trade, particularly as European and other foreign banks reconnect with their Iranian counterparts and global shippers return to Iranian ports. Moreover, there is the open question of whether increased trade ties between Iran and other foreign firms will undo some of the reputational risk that lingers on for U.S. firms interested in but ultimately skeptical of permissible Iran-related opportunities. I wouldn’t necessarily expect quick movement, but I would expect some movement on both of these fronts in the months ahead.

Tyler Cullis

Mr. Cullis is an Associate Attorney at Ferrari & Associates, P.C. where he is engaged in the practice of U.S. economic sanctions, including trade compliance, regulatory licensing matters, and federal investigations and prosecutions. Mr. Cullis has extensive experience counseling clients on matters falling under the purview of the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). He has provided counsel to U.S. and foreign parties on complex cross-border transactions and compliance with U.S. economic sanctions; conducted corporate internal investigations and developed sanctions compliance policies; and submitted license applications and voluntary self-disclosures to OFAC. Mr. Cullis has advised global financial institutions, multi-national corporations, U.S. and foreign exporters and insurers, as well as private individuals regarding U.S. sanctions matters, including matters involving Russia, Iran, and Cuba.

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