Following months of tough negotiations, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2321 last week imposing additional sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear weapons proliferation and ballistic missile development. The resolution is worth its own elaborated discussion, but I will stick herein to its potential meaning for the application of U.S. sanctions targeting North Korea and those third parties supporting the regime, as UNSCR 2321 opens the door for the United States to utilize its existing sanctions authorities and bring to bear significantly more pressure on the regime.

Soon after passage of UNSCR 2321, I had prepared a blog post predicting a quick U.S. response imposing additional sanctions targeting North Korea. However, OFAC’s response was so fast that it announced a new set of sanctions designations before I had time to post the article itself. On December 2nd, a mere two days following the resolution’s passage, OFAC designated 16 entities and seven individuals for their ties to the North Korean government or its nuclear and proliferation-related efforts (three of the individuals were also designated for sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 2321). These included North Korea’s national flag carrier, a bevy of North Korean financial institutions, and a state-controlled energy enterprise, amongst others.

OFAC’s action appears to be but an opening salvo in its efforts to increase the pressure on North Korea to cease its nuclear weapons program or set the stage for serious denuclearization talks. Recently, Congress and the President have taken action to dramatically increase the scope of existing sanctions authorities targeting the activities of North Korea and its benefactors, yet have limited the use of those authorities absent closer agreement with China – North Korea’s largest trading partner. Having negotiated UNSCR 2321 with the Chinese over the past several months, the United States is well positioned to more broadly utilize those authorities to squeeze the Government of North Korea and those affiliated with it.

Likely the most significant sanctions authority available to the President, Executive Order 13722 – codifying and clarifying the authorities granted to the President pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (enacted this past February) – provides OFAC with substantial additional authorities to impose industry-wide sanctions on North Korea, as well as on persons either supplying or purchasing certain goods (i.e., metal, graphite, coal, or software) to or from North Korea. In OFAC’s latest action, these powers were used to designate Air Koryo – North Korea’s national flag carrier owning and operating all of the DRPK’s civilian aircraft – for operating in North Korea’s transportation sector; North East Asia Bank, Koryo Credit Development Bank, Rason International Commercial Bank, Kumgang Bank, Koryo Bank, and the Korean National Insurance Corporation for operating in North Korea’s financial services sector; and Korea Oil Exploration Corporation for operating in the North Korea’s energy industry. Evidently, OFAC is showing no hesitation in imposing such industry-wide sanctions on North Korea – sanctions which have extraterritorial effect insofar as they subject to future designation persons providing material support to the designated parties.

Will the trend continue? I believe so. As with the UNSC resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the United States will use UNSCR 2321 – as well as its immediate predecessors – as the multilateral basis under which it imposes its broad, unilateral, and extra-territorial sanctions targeting North Korea and all third parties dealing with the regime and parties thereto. The playbook remains the same; and barring some unforeseen policy changes with the inauguration of President-elect Trump, it stands for ready use.