OFAC Designations as Strategic Communications
Last week the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah under E.O. 13582 for his organization’s aid to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Also named were two senior Hezbollah leaders designated under E.O. 13224 for their ties to terrorism. For those who do not actively follow OFAC or Middle East politics, it might come as a shock that OFAC would only now be getting around to designating Nasrallah, who has led Hezbollah since the killing of Abbas al-Musawi by Israeli forces in February, 1992. But as Foreign Policy’s Josh Rogin points out, Nasrallah is in fact one of the longest tenured members of OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, having been added by President Clinton on January 24, 1995 pursuant to E.O. 12947. Since his name already appears on OFAC’s list, the additional designation will have no immediate practical effect, as he is already barred from transactions within the United States or with any U.S. person, and any assets he once had in the United States have long been frozen. It is highly doubtful that Hezbollah’s leader is sleeping any less soundly tonight because of his re-designation, though it’s unlikely he ever sleeps particularly well given how often he is reported to relocate in order to stay one step ahead of Israeli intelligence. The question then becomes, why did OFAC decide (or why were they told) to re-designate Nasrallah?
According to the State Department’s counterterrorism czar Daniel Benjamin, the new designation was meant to “expose the activity of the party that is being designated for the conduct that has led to the designation.” Benjamin’s explanation is the latest example of a broader evolution in OFAC’s role that has taken place during the Obama administration. During the last three years, OFAC re-designations have increasingly been used to communicate US national security priorities and to focus international attention on individuals, organizations, or nations acting against U.S. interests. The most extreme case of this evolution is Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, who has been designated on no fewer than three separate occasions under three different executive orders, in addition to his European Union and United Nations designations.
The origin of this shift likely lies in the increasing role financial sanctions have played in our efforts to prevent/dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Since its inception in 1962, OFAC has handled an array of sanctions programs, dealing with everything from narcotics to Cuba. In most cases, sanctions represented only a small part of our overall efforts to confront a particular problem issue or country. However, as Iran’s nuclear program has gathered steam over the past several years, increasing financial pressure on that country has been the U.S. government’s go-to response, particularly after the passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010. Treasury officials such as Stuart Levey, David Cohen, and Adam Szubin, who at one point likely would have toiled in relative obscurity, became the face of U.S. efforts to combat what many view as the primary threat to United States national security.
However, the events of the past week demonstrate why OFAC is ill-suited to its new role as a communicator of U.S. policy. On a slower newsday, Treasury’s press release would have generated some very minor interest. But with the world transfixed on images of angry mobs breaching US embassies around the world and reacting to the tragic death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, the designations were almost entirely ignored. If the goal of re-designating Hassan Nasrallah under E.O. 13582 was to focus attention on Hezbollah’s support for the Assad regime, OFAC’s action missed its mark. If the magnitude of an individual or entities threat to U.S. national security is such that they have violated multiple sanctions regimes, and OFAC seeks to call attention to such threat, then action should be highlighted in such a way that the world takes notice. From OFAC’s perspective, it is perhaps would have been more worthwhile to wide publicize the fact that the Assad regime has received supplies and military training from Hezbollah, particularly since the European Union has thus far declined to identify the group as a terrorist organization. A statement from a rarely recognized, albeit important, agency within the Department of the Treasury simply does not adequately convey the extent of the United States’ concern to either the target or the general public.
Leaving aside the thoughts above, it should also be highlighted that this is the first time that the U.S. government has identified Talal Hamiyah as the leader of Hezbollah’s External Security Organization (ESO) and the heir to Imad Mugniyah, the alleged perpetrator of the 1985 TWA flight 847 hijacking, who was slain under mysterious circumstances in Damascus in 2008. Given the recent string of Hezbollah or Iran-linked plots that have been alleged over the several years, it is interesting that Hamiyah’s name hasn’t received greater attention.
*Today’s post is written by Samuel Cutler. Sam was recently brought into the firm as our policy advisor. We are delighted to have him on board and hope that he becomes a regular contributor to Sanction Law.
The author of this blog is Erich Ferrari, an attorney specializing in OFAC matters. If you have any questions please contact him at 202-280-6370 or ferrari@ferrari-legal.com.