European Oil Majors Want U.S. Competition in Iran
I can’t begin to express the amount of times I have run across concern from European officials that the U.S. is seeking to claim Iran’s market opportunities for its own. Despite the persistence of the U.S.’s trade embargo with Iran, some in Europe think the Obama administration is preparing to launch U.S. companies into an end-run around their European competitors, cashing in first on the promising opportunities that Iran bears for foreign traders and investors.
In discussions with European officials, I have tried to express how wrong-headed this view is. Far from seeking to jump the line ahead of European companies into Tehran, I have explained, U.S. persons and entities will continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in most transactions with Iran or Iran-related parties. Moreover, there is no immediate sign that the Obama administration is intent on lifting those remaining sanctions prohibitions targeting U.S. person dealings with Iran. This is not some ruse that U.S. officials have dreamed up to ease Europe into complacency, but is instead the continuation of a decades-long policy towards Iran that was largely left unaffected by the nuclear agreement.
In short, all I can say is: Don’t worry, Europe. Iran’s market opportunities are all yours.
Nonetheless, there are certain areas where Europe is clamoring for the United States to lift some of its trade restrictions to allow for further U.S. involvement in Iran’s market. This is especially true in those sectors where Iran is seeking long-term investment, such as the oil sector. Here, risk is heightened, as predicting events a decade or two out is next-to-impossible. Fearful of the repercussions should the U.S. decide to re-impose sanctions on Iran — whether with or without cause – European oil majors are not so much opposed to competition from their U.S. counterparts as they are welcoming it with open arms.
The reason is obvious: the United States is less likely to take action to undermine the nuclear agreement – including imposing new sanctions on Iran without cause – should U.S. oil majors have long-term contracts for the development of Iran’s oil fields. In other words, U.S. commercial engagement with Iran will inhibit U.S. political actors from taking action in opposition to the nuclear deal, thereby decreasing the risk that European oil majors will have to bear investing their resources in Iran over the long-term. Because Iran needs more than $30 billion of foreign investment in its oil sector over the next decade – according to Iran’s oil minister – there is both more than enough to share and all the reason to do so.
Here, then, is one more facet to a theme that I have developed – i.e., that the survival of the U.S. trade embargo with Iran continues to affect foreign persons as do surviving U.S. secondary sanctions authorities. In previous cases, I have identified how the U.S. trade embargo with Iran affects foreign person dealings with Iran either directly (via continuing restrictions on the re-export of U.S.-origin goods or on facilitation by U.S. persons of trade-related dealings with Iran) or indirectly (via the difficulties conducting dollar-denominated transactions with Iran when no dollar-clearing is permitted in the United States). In this case, though, the surviving sanctions prohibitions barring U.S. oil majors from investing in Iran’s oil sector negatively affect the risk-calculations being made by European oil giants concerning their re-entry into Iran.
In short, it is difficult to separate out continued restrictions on U.S. person dealings with Iran from the calculations being made by foreign persons and companies regarding whether to resume business dealings with Tehran. Despite being intended to affect U.S. persons or persons within the United States, the U.S. trade embargo with Iran has far-reaching implications that will continue to affect the business decisions of foreign companies considering extending ties to Iran.