Congress Wants A Say In Iran Deal, Not New (Poorly Written) Sanctions
Judging by this week’s hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, President Obama’s veto will likely be the last word on any new Iran sanctions, if it even comes to that. Which is probably a good thing because the sanctions bill currently under consideration is a mess. That said, there still appears to be a strong bipartisan consensus that Congress should have a say in any comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
Much of the media attention has predictably focused on New Jersey Democrat and sanctions super-hawk Bob Menendez’s claim that “the more I hear from the administration and its quotes, the more it sounds like talking points that come straight out of Iran.” Sen. Menendez’s harsh words won’t come as a surprise to many, it has been clear for the last several years that he believes himself a better judge of U.S. sanctions policy than other members of Congress, the Treasury Department, the State Department, the Intelligence Community, and the White House. In November 2011 he famously laid in to Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in a hearing on the Kirk-Menendez amendment to the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, declaring that Cohen’s testimony “undermined…your relationship with me for the future.”
But Ranking Member’s histrionics aside, there appeared to be scant support from other committee members for new sanctions of the variety proposed by Sen. Menendez and Sen. Mark Kirk. Only Sen. Menendez and Sen. Marco Rubio expressed strong support for new sanctions, while the rest of the committee’s Democrats, as well as Republicans Rand Paul and Jeff Flake were in opposition. Tellingly, chairman Bob Corker had no interest in discussing sanctions and repeatedly attempted to the discussion towards the role of Congress in approving any potential comprehensive deal.
Though enthusiasm for new sanctions was decidedly muted, members from both parties were in agreement that Congress deserved a say in the final deal. Chairman Corker was adamant that his bill, which subjects any nuclear deal to congressional review, was necessary to ensure that the terms of a deal were both acceptable and sustainable. Many democrats largely echoed his views, in particular Sen. Tim Kaine. Surprisingly, Sens. Paul and Barbara Boxer announced they were teaming up on a bill that would also require Congress approve any deal.
It’s probably a good thing that the Kirk-Menendez bill appears far from a veto-proof majority, because it’s not the best-written piece of sanctions legislation out there.
For instance, Section 205 amends the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (“TRA”) to create an unenforceable requirement that blocks property within U.S. jurisdiction, received in the past from certain new categories of blocked persons, by their family members. This begs the question, are banks supposed to go back through their entire customer list to identify family members and then check every transaction with that family member to identify transactions that originated with a blocked party?
Section 206, which also amends the TRA, is entirely unclear on whether prohibitions on currency exchanges exempt transactions with Iranian financial institutions blocked solely pursuant to EO 13599, other than the Central Bank of Iran (“CBI”). Section 222(b)(1)(A) includes transactions with CBI and Iranian financial institutions designated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Strictly speaking, all Iranian financial institutions not designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 (terrorism) or 13382 (WMD proliferation) are blocked rather than designated, though the distinction is often blurred despite distinct legal differences. Section 222 (b)(1)(B) includes transactions with persons designated pursuant to 1244(c)(2) of the Iranian Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (“IFCA”), such as persons involved in the energy, shipping, shipbuilding, or port sectors of Iran. However, it exempts persons described in subparagraph (C)(iii) of 1244(c)(2), which is anyone else on the SDN list other than Iranian financial institutions designated solely pursuant to 13599.
Based on a strict reading, Section 222(b)(1)(B) exempts individuals on the SDN list, but does not exempt Iranian financial institutions blocked solely pursuant to 13599. Yet Section 222(b)(1)(A) is not clear on whether the prohibitions include 13599 financial institutions. There is an enormous difference between prohibited foreign exchange transactions with entities already subject to secondary sanctions, plus the CBI, and doing so for the entire Iranian financial system.
Additionally – what is this: “PRIMARY JURISDICTION.—For Purposes of paragraph (1), a country in which a person operates shall be deemed to have primary jurisdiction over the person only with respect to the operations of the person in that country”? Ummm, ok…..
Other issues include definitional inconsistencies in Section 203 and the requirement in Section 102 that the President submit not only the deal but a detailed “verification assessment” in order for new sanctions to be avoided.
I asked both a former Senate staffer and a former OFAC official about the writing in the bill; neither was particularly complimentary.
A markup is scheduled for January 29th in the Senate Banking Committee, let’s hope, on the off chance that the bill ends up becoming law, that a more refined version emerges.
The author of this blog is Erich Ferrari, an attorney specializing in OFAC matters. This post was written by Samuel Cutler, Policy Advisor at Ferrari & Associates, P.C. If you have any questions please contact them at 202-280-6370 or ferrari@ferrariassociatespc.com or cutler@ferrariassociatespc.com.