In a previous post, I discussed how critics of the nuclear deal were misinterpreting the snapback sanctions provision in the JCPOA, viewing it as an all-or-nothing matter that could not account for small-scale breaches on the part of the Iranians. I noted how their reading was in error, as it ignored the express language of the JCPOA, which permitted the U.S. to cease its JCPOA commitments in whole or in part should the U.S. believe Iran to be engaged in significant non-performance of its own JCPOA obligations. In my view, the JCPOA provided for a flexible snapback sanctions option, where small-scale violations on the part of the Iranians could be deterred by the re-imposition of certain U.S. and/or multilateral sanctions.

Now we have confirmation that my reading was correct.

In his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee last Wednesday, Acting Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Adam Szubin, addressed this issue head-on:

To those with concerns that Iran can accumulate minor violations over time, it is important  to clarify that if there are small violations, we can address them through a variety of measures – snapback does not have to be an all or nothing. This approach gives us maximum flexibility and maximum leverage.

Considering Szubin’s long-held claim to something of a U.S. sanctions czar, I regard his interpretation of the JCPOA provision – which I’m sure he had a hand in authoring – to be the authoritative one. Should Iran be found in violation of certain JCPOA commitments, the U.S. can respond in one of the following ways:

1. Re-impose some of its sanctions;
2. Re-impose all of its sanctions;
3. Take the issue to the UN Security Council; or
4. Take the issue to the UN Security Council and re-impose some or all of its sanctions

In other words, the U.S. can tailor snapback sanctions however it deems fit. As Szubin himself noted, “maximum flexibility and maximum leverage.”