It should be obvious by now that whenever the U.S. faces any sort of national security threat, one of the primary responses is the imposition of sanctions. So as evidence mounted that November’s massive The Interview-related cyber-attack was of North Korean origin, the countdown started on the United States’ (i.e. Treasury’s) inevitable response. That response came in the form of a new Executive Order and accompanying designations. Individuals and entities listed pursuant to this new executive order, E.O. 13687, are tagged with the [DPRK2] identifier.

As far as OFAC designations go, these were a bit anticlimactic. The three entities were already listed pursuant to other authorities, while most of the individuals were linked to the E.O. 13382-designated Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Of the designees, only the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is alleged to have any involvement in cyber operations. Given the entities prior designations, it’s fairly clear that these new sanctions are of the signaling variety and aren’t really intended to have a significant economic impact on the targets.

New sanctions are only one component of President Obama’s vow to respond “proportionally” to North Korean “cybervandalism.” While it’s unclear exactly what else the United States intends to do, the entire North Korean Internet has gone down several times in the past few weeks.

Much of the messaging deployed by U.S. officials has focused on the dangers to private enterprise poised by cyberattacks. Treasury’s press release on the new sanctions states that the actions are one step in an effort to “hold North Korea accountable for its destabilizing, destructive and repressive actions, particularly its efforts to undermine U.S. cyber-security and intimidate U.S. businesses.” President Obama also warned, “If we set a precedent in which a dictator in another country can disrupt through cyber, a company’s distribution chain or its products, and as a consequence we start censoring ourselves, that’s a problem.”

While the cyber realm is certainly a novel justification for new sanctions, this is not the first time that the U.S. has deployed sanctions to in retaliation for attacks on commercial activity. In fact one of the pillars of the United States’ most comprehensive sanctions regimes is predicated in part on protecting the free flow of commerce.

From 1984-1988, Iran and Iraq engaged in an ongoing campaign, known as the Tanker War, in which both combatants targeted ships moving through the Persian Gulf, oil tankers in particular. By mid-1987, the United States had agreed to flag Kuwaiti tankers and offer protection. Following a series of incidents in which Iran targeted U.S.-registered tankers with cruise missiles and mines, on October 20, 1987 the U.S. conducted a “prudent yet restrained response,” dubbed Operation Nimble Archer, by shelling two Iranian offshore oil platforms.

In addition to the kinetic response, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12613, which prohibited the importation of Iranian-origin goods and services. According to the text of the E.O. the new restrictions were necessary because of Iranian “aggressive and unlawful military action against U.S.-flag vessels and merchant vessels of other non-belligerent nations engaged in lawful and peaceful commerce in international waters of the Persian Gulf and territorial waters of non-belligerent nations of that region.”

Clearly safeguarding the free flow of oil is more of a strategic priority for the U.S. than ensuring Seth Rogen and James Franco can fictionally assassinate Kim Jong Un. Nevertheless, the new DPRK sanctions are a reflection of existing precedent that the U.S. will use financial measures to respond to attempts to target its commercial interests.

The author of this blog is Erich Ferrari, an attorney specializing in OFAC matters. This post was written by Samuel Cutler, Policy Advisor at Ferrari & Associates, P.C. If you have any questions please contact them at 202-280-6370 or ferrari@ferrariassociatespc.com or cutler@ferrariassociatespc.com.