2015 brought new opportunities and new challenges in the sanctions world. The most interesting developments, however, start and end with the lifting of sanctions on Cuba and Iran.

Some of the oldest sanctions programs administered by OFAC, both the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”) and the Iranian sanctions programs underwent (and continue to undergo) lasting changes in 2015, as OFAC was called upon to lift certain sanctions on both countries. In the case of Cuba, this involved seeing how far current executive authorities could be pushed to open up trade between the two countries, as the Obama administration sought to normalize relations with the Cuban island for the first time in more than five decades. Similarly, following the advent of a nuclear agreement between the United States, other major world powers, and Iran, the U.S. was obligated to relieve secondary nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as well as certain of its primary sanctions targeting Iran.

While both projects remain in development, they involved OFAC stepping out of its traditional comfort zone – in which it administers sanctions prohibitions on certain countries, regimes, and persons – and moving into a more discerning arena where it was called upon to permit (and, in so many ways, actively encourage) certain trade ties with formerly sanctioned jurisdictions. Right now, the Obama administration is pushing for expanded trade ties with Cuba and encouraging business delegations to travel to the island to cement deals. It is hoped that, in doing so, enough momentum will be created that any successive administration will feel it impossible to reverse developments begun by the Obama administration. Similarly, despite retaining large parts of its primary trade embargo with Iran, the U.S. will soon render permissive most foreign trade ties with Iran and will seek to open certain direct trade ties with Iran.

How OFAC goes about both will be illustrative of future developments in U.S. sanctions policy, as well as in the administration of U.S. sanctions programs. While the U.S. has relieved sanctions in the past, never has it done so with so much at stake. For example, should foreign business fail to seek trade ties with Iran out of concern over surviving U.S. sanctions authorities, then Iran will lose the benefit of its bargain under the nuclear agreement and could decide that the restrictions on its nuclear program are no longer worth the price of admission. As a result, U.S. foreign policy goals will not be achieved, and the utility of U.S. economic sanctions will be called into question. Concern over how the U.S. would implement its commitment to relieve sanctions on Iran was so intense during the nuclear negotiations that, as part of the nuclear agreement, the U.S. is obligated to consult with Iran as to what its public messaging will be regarding sanctions relief. It is expected – at least on the Iranian side – that OFAC will put in the same commitment it did imposing sanctions as it will relieving sanctions on Iran. Any perceived failures will call into question Iran’s own nuclear-related commitments under the agreement signed this past July.

Similarly, we’ve seen successive rounds of FAQs regarding OFAC’s lifting of certain trade sanctions with Cuba. This is demonstrative of a back-and-forth between OFAC and the U.S. business community, in which aiding U.S. trade ties with the Cuban island has involved sustained engagement with the commercial sector. It is expected that the Obama administration will utilize further authorities to open up broader areas of trade should the initial sanctions relief prove successful.

How these developments transfer over to 2016 could be determinative of how useful U.S. economic sanctions are as a tool of national security policymaking. For the past decade, U.S. sanctions have taken an ever larger role in the toolkit of U.S. national security policymaking. Yet, their ultimate utility has been thrown into question time and again, as critics have questioned whether they actually serve their purpose of reversing the behavior of targeted countries, regimes, and persons that are perceived to be anathema to U.S. security interests. Whether OFAC is able to adequately relieve sanctions on Cuba and Iran and permit (if not encourage) trade ties with the two countries could settle the matter in the upcoming year. No matter what, 2016 will prove to be a continuation of critical developments in U.S. sanctions, as well as a barometer of the future of U.S. sanctions themselves.