One of the most curious critiques of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) agreed to by the U.S., other world powers, and Iran is that the nuclear deal lacks a usable snapback sanctions provision. Perhaps I’m being too kind – it’s not just a curious critique, it’s a dead-wrong critique. That’s because the critique directly contradicts the plain text of the JCPOA.

According to the critics, the snapback provision is too blunt an instrument to meaningfully deter incremental violations of the JCPOA by Iran. Under their reading of § 36 of the Main Text of the JCPOA, the U.S. has the available option to snapback all provisions of the previous UNSC resolutions should it deem Iran to be in ‘significant non-performance’ of its JCPOA commitments. While this is surely a potent instrument to enforce compliance with snapback sanctions, the problem – as the critics tell it – is that it leaves the U.S. vulnerable to acceding to minor, incremental Iranian violations of the JCPOA.

The reason is that the U.S. will be reluctant to snapback all of these sanctions when the likely effect would be to effectively kill the deal. Why take such punitive action for what may be a minor, if meaningful, violation of the JCPOA – especially if the effect would be that Iran would renege on all of its commitments under the JCPOA in return? Absent a more flexible response, minor Iranian violations will have to be swallowed since the U.S. will not sacrifice all the constraints a deal would still impose on Iran.

The problem with this critique is that it fundamentally misreads the relevant passage of the JCPOA. Here is that passage (parts bolded for emphasis):

If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

Few things to note: First, the determination as to whether an issue of Iranian compliance constitutes a case of ‘significant non-performance’ or not lies wholly with the ‘complaining participant’ (i.e., the U.S.). This is a pretty significant coup for the United States, as it will be able to determine for itself whether Iranian violations of the JCPOA warrant snapback sanctions or not. The issue does not need to be turned over to an independent arbitral body or require the unanimous consent of the E3/EU+3 (or any other machination that would remove the final decision from the hands of the United States).

Second, contrary to the critiques, the U.S. has more than one option. That is made explicit in the bolded section of the above passage from the JCPOA. Should the U.S. believe Iran to be in violation of the JCPOA, the U.S. has three options available to it:

(1)       Cease performing its commitments in whole (i.e., snapback of all U.S. sanctions)

(2)       Cease performing its commitments in part (i.e., snapback of some U.S. sanctions)

(3)       Go to the UN Security Council for full snapback of previous UNSC resolutions

This means that the U.S. can tailor its snapback response as it deems appropriate. It can snapback all of its sanctions or some of its sanctions – if and when it itself deems Iran to be in violation of the JCPOA. This is not just a potent option to deter Iran from violating the JCPOA, but a flexible one as well.

Third, no one should underestimate the deterrent nature of this provision. While the Iranians have claimed that this provisions applies as equally to them as it does to the other JCPOA participants (meaning that Iran could take advantage of § 36 of the Main Text should it regard the U.S. or any other party to be non-compliant with its obligations under the JCPOA), there is a fundamental imbalance to this provision. That’s because Iran cannot take advantage of the snapback of UNSC sanctions since those apply only to it – not to the other JCPOA participants. Certainly, Iran could cease performing its own commitments under the JCPOA in whole or in part in response to what it regards as ‘significant non-performance’ by the U.S. or any other party, but that is a remedy unlikely to be used considering the fact that Iran is dealing with multiple nations and will be reluctant to cease its JCPOA commitments so long as it procures benefit from some of them. Moreover, because of the non-adjudicatory nature of the snapback, nothing would prevent the U.S. from taking the issue to the Security Council to snapback all UNSC sanctions should Iran cease its commitments. The JCPOA does not become inoperable just because one party – say, Iran – has taken advantage of its provisions in § 36 of the Main Text.

For all of these reasons, the snapback sanctions provision is an impressive victory for the United States. Frankly, I’m surprised Iran agreed to it. Critics who profess their dissatisfaction with it are misreading the relevant portions of the text and proposing alternatives that do not match in scale the power, potency, and flexibility of what is already contained in § 36 of the Main Text of the JCPOA.