Not surprisingly, Iran continues to have significant problems finding foreign banks willing to provide financing or resume correspondent relations with Iranian financial institutions. But Iran’s officials are beginning to raise the issue in ways that could demand additional steps be taken by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).

Last week, Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency Chief Ali Akbar Salehi stated that he had raised the issue of Iran’s ongoing difficulties finding European banking partners with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. (The fact that sanctions issues are being brought up between the two physicists is interesting enough.) Soon thereafter, Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani publicly decried the “delay” with which the U.S. was fulfilling its commitments to lift the sanctions, citing the banking issue.

This past weekend, more Iranian officials raised the issue publicly, including Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi who was deeply involved in the nuclear negotiations. Takht Ravanchi criticized Europe’s banks for their “cautious behavior” in resuming relations with Iranian financial institutions and blamed Iran’s current classification as a “high risk” jurisdiction for AML/CFT concerns by the Financial Action Task Force for such caution. Speaking at the same business conference in Tehran, Iran’s Central Bank Vice-Governor Hamid Tehranfar stated that the reason behind European banks’ reluctance to pursue relations with their Iranian counterparts stemmed from persistent “Iranophobia in the banking sector.”

That Iran’s banks are having trouble reconnecting with the global financial system has been no secret – despite the lifting of certain U.S. and EU banking sanctions. But something is obviously going on behind the scenes when Iran’s officials are raising the issue in such a public manner as they have this past week.

Question is, what can that be? I have some guesses.

Pursuant to § 27 of the JCPOA’s Main Text, the U.S. and the European Union are obligated to “issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under th[e] JCPOA.” Some of these materials had been issued on Implementation Day, though it is my understanding that additional guidance will be provided as OFAC receives more feedback from those interested in pursuing legitimate Iran-related trade. Moreover, the JCPOA obligates the U.S. and the European Union “to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.”

Such consultation is certainly taking place behind the scenes. Some of this was publicly revealed when Iran’s Ambassador to Germany Ali Majedi spoke to the same business conference in Tehran this past weekend. According to Majedi, he was in close contact with German officials and hoped to soon resolve the banking issue. Moreover, Majedi stated last month that OFAC would send a delegation to Germany for an official visit to resolve ongoing concerns in the German banking sector about resuming trade with Iran. (I have heard of certain similar visits by Treasury officials to Europe over the past month or so, so this is happening on a much more regular basis than publicly revealed.) We may be seeing a push by Iran for much more of these kinds of visits in order to resolve ongoing issues faced by major European banks.

Moreover, § 24 of the JCPOA’s Main Text provides that “[i]f at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in th[e] JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action.”

In other words, the JCPOA specifically provides for a scenario where the U.S. lifts certain additional sanctions in order to ensure that Iran receives the benefit of its bargain under the nuclear accord. Unlikely though it is, a significant move to alleviate the pressure on non-U.S., non-Iranian banks would be to re-authorize U-turn transactions (an authorization that was only revoked in November 2008), so that Iran can once again clear dollars through the U.S. financial system. That would certainly resolve continuing concerns for European banks on how to separate out Iran-related transactions to ensure that they do not pass through New York.

Most likely, Iranian officials are pushing on both ends to see what can give on the U.S. side. To be sure, the U.S. will be reluctant to do more than it already has, pointing out that the decision by European banks not to reconnect with Iranian financial institutions is a commercial decision that is not the responsibility of the United States and can rather be chalked up to persistent deficiencies in Iran’s financial system. But nonetheless, in consideration of the good-faith with which both parties have pursued implementation of the nuclear agreement thus far, there will be ongoing discussions on how to resolve Iran’s concerns so that the constraints on Iran’s nuclear program remain undisturbed.  Where those discussions lead will be a point of interest for the foreseeable future.